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Abstract
In this paper we investigate if government balanced-budget rules together with
endogenous taxation may lead to aggregate instability in an endogenous growth
framework. After highlighting the differences with the exogenous growth framework,
we prove that under counter-cyclical consumption taxes, while there exists a unique
balanced growth path, sunspot equilibria based on self-fulfilling expectations occur
through a form of global indeterminacy. In addition, we argue that this result is
empirically plausible for a large set of OECD countries and that it may also emerge
with endogenous income taxes.
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1 Introduction
Balanced-budget rules recommendations to governments has been a recurrent debate
after the starting of the last financial crisis, concerning mainly their consequences in
terms of government debt sustainability. As shown by Schaechter et al. [26], in 2012
approximately 60 countries, mostly advanced, have adopted a type of balanced-
budget rule either at the national or supra-national level. Balanced-budget rules
can be implemented as overall balance, structural or cyclically adjusted balance,
and balance “over the cycle”. Since the beginning of the Great Recession in 2008,
the first type of rule has been debated throughout Europe and adopted by some
countries like Germany or Switzerland as a “Golden Rule”.
But this type of balanced-budget rule has been criticized concerning its economic
stabilization features. Since the paper of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [28], it is a
well established fact that balanced-budget rules may lead to belief-driven aggregate
instability and endogenous sunspot fluctuations. However, depending on the fiscal
policy, aggregate instability occurs under different types of preferences. While it
requires a large enough income effect when labor income taxes are considered (see
Abad et al. [1]),1 low enough income effects are necessary under consumption taxes
(see Nourry et al. [25]). Such a conclusion has strong policy implications as for a
given specification of preferences, one type of fiscal policy must be preferred to the
other if the government is willing to avoid endogenous fluctuations. For instance,
under a standard additively-separable utility function, Giannitsarou [13] suggests
that consumption taxes must be favoured with respect to income or capital taxes as
they reduce the possible occurrence of aggregate instability.
These results can be criticized in two dimensions. First, as clearly mentioned by
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [28], they are partially based on the assumption that tax
rates are not predetermined,2 while taxes are in practice typically set in advance.3
Second, they are established within stationary models without long-run growth.
The aim of this paper is to revisit the issue of aggregate instability coming from
balanced-budget rules focusing on consumption taxes compatible with endogenous
1Actually, local indeterminacy requires that consumption and labor are Edgeworth substitutes
or weak Edgeworth complements (see also Linnemann [19]). These properties are associated to a
Jaimovich-Rebelo [16] utility function characterized by a large enough income effect.
2The initial value of the tax rate is indeed a function of a forward variable (i.e., consumption
or labor).
3It is however claimed in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [28] that their main conclusions are robust
to the consideration of a discrete-time reformulation of their model with tax rates set k ≥ 1 periods
in advance to that in each period t ≥ 0, the tax rates for periods t, · · · , t+k−1 are pre-determined.
2
growth. In practice, this requirement implies that the tax rate depends on de-
trended consumption to have a constant tax on a balanced growth path. As a
consequence, we consider a time-varying consumption tax which is a predetermined
variable and we are thus able to solve the two main weaknesses of the standard
literature.
We consider a standard neoclassical growth model augmented with a govern-
ment that provides a constant stream of expenditures financed through consumption
taxes and a balanced budget rule. Endogenous growth is obtained from assuming a
Barro-type [3] production function in which government spending acts as an external
productive input. In order to have a constant tax on a balanced growth path, the
tax rate needs to depend on de-trended consumption and thus becomes a state vari-
able with a given initial condition. Finally, we consider a representative household
characterized by a CRRA utility function and inelastic labor. Such a formulation
is known to rule out the existence of endogenous fluctuations in exogenous growth
models (see Giannitsarou [13]).
We first prove that there exists a unique Balanced Growth Path (BGP) along
which the common growth rate of consumption, capital, GDP and government
spending is constant. The particularity of such a BGP is that the equilibrium tax
rate is just equal to its initial value. A consequence of this property is that, as in the
Barro [3] model, there is no transitional dynamics with respect to this unique un-
stable BGP and, therefore, there exists a unique initial choice of consumption such
that the economy evolves along its BGP. This conclusion is thus similar to the one
reached by Giannitsarou [13]: there is a priori no room for endogenous fluctuations.
However, we can prove that the BGP is not the unique long run solution of our
model. Indeed, if the tax rule is counter-cyclical with respect to consumption, for any
arbitrary initial value of the tax rate, close enough to its initial condition, there exists
a corresponding value for the tax rate, consumption, capital and the constant growth
rate that can be an asymptotic equilibrium of our economy, namely an Asymptotic
Balanced Growth Path (ABGP). An ABGP is not itself an equilibrium as it does not
respect the initial conditions. However we prove that some transitional dynamics
exist with a unique equilibrium path converging toward this ABGP. Moreover, we
show that there exist a continuum of such ABGP and of equilibria each of them
converging over time to a different ABGP.4
The existence of an equilibrium path converging to an ABGP is associated to the
4On the other hand, we can prove that if the consumption tax is procyclical then the BGP is
the unique equilibrium path.
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existence of consumers’ beliefs that are different from those associated to the BGP.
Indeed, they may believe that the consumption tax profile will not remain constant
but rather change over time and eventually converge to a positive value different from
the initial condition. A specific form of global indeterminacy emerges since from a
given initial tax rate, the representative agent can choose an initial consumption to
be immediately on the unique BGP or alternatively an initial consumption consistent
with any other equilibrium converging to an ABGP. Again different choices reveal
different consumers’ beliefs of the long run outcome of the economy.
Because this specific form of global indeterminacy is fundamentally related to
expectations, one may wonder about the possible existence of sunspot equilibria and
endogenous fluctuations based on self-fulfilling beliefs. To this purpose, we adapt
existing results (e.g. Shigoka [29], Benhabib et al. [7], Cazzavillan [9]) and we show
that sunspot equilibria can be obtained by randomizing over the deterministic equi-
libria converging to the ABGPs. From an analytical viewpoint, we assume that the
sunspot variable is a continuous time homogenous Markov chain and we use the gen-
erator of the chain as proposed by Grimmett and Stirzaker [14] to prove the existence
of sunspot equilibria. We then conclude that in an endogenous growth framework,
contrary to the conclusions of Giannitsarou [13], endogenous sunspot fluctuations
may arise under a balanced-budget rule and consumption taxes although there ex-
ists a unique underlying BGP equilibrium. It is also worth noting that contrary to
Drugeon and Wigniolle [11] or Nishimura and Shigoka [24], our methodology allows
to prove the existence of sunspots in a non-stationary economic environment while
the steady state (BGP) is unstable.
Our results can be compared to some recent conclusions provided by Angeletos
and La’O [2] and Benhabib et al. [5] within infinite horizon models with senti-
ments. They show that endogenous fluctuations, based on a certain type of extrinsic
shocks called “sentiments", can be accommodated in unique-equilibrium, rational-
expectations, macroeconomic models like those in the RBC/DSGE paradigm pro-
vided there is some mechanism that prevents the agents from having identical equi-
librium expectations. Of course, our framework is still based on the existence of
externalities as we need to generate a form of Ak technology to get endogenous
growth. But, contrary to the standard literature which is based on the existence
of local indeterminacy (see Benhabib and Farmer [4]), we find sunspot fluctuations
while there exists a unique deterministic BGP without transitional dynamics. The
existence of the continuum of ABGPs and of equilibrium paths converging to these,
is also fundamentally based on the expectations of agents.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the firms and
4
households’ behaviors. Section 3 discusses fiscal policies under balanced-budget rules
comparing exogenous and endogenous growth models and presents the consumption
tax rule that we consider in the paper. Section 4 defines the intertemporal equi-
librium. Section 5 proves the existence and uniqueness of a BGP. In Section 6 its
stability is investigated and it is also shown that depending on agents’ expecta-
tions, there may exist a continuum of other equilibria that converge toward some
ABGPs. Based on this conclusion, we prove in Section 7 that sunspot equilibria and
endogenous fluctuations based on self-fulfilling beliefs occur and we show through
a numerical exercise that the existence of aggregate instability and sunspot fluc-
tuations driven by consumption tax rates is empirically plausible for a large set
of OECD countries. Section 8 proves the robustness of our results showing that
the same conclusions can be obtained under income taxes. Section 9 contains a
conclusion and all the proofs are provided in a final Appendix.
2 Description of the private sector
In this section the endogenous growth model originally developed by Barro [3] is
modified by assuming that the government levies a time-varying consumption tax
to finance its spending. In this economy the government spending is productive
since it is a public good provided by the government to the firms which use it
as an essential input of production. For this reason, our paper is different from
Giannitsarou [13] and Nourry et al. [25] where the government spending is just a
pure waste of resources. As in Barro [3], productive government spending is the
source of endogenous growth in our model.
2.1 Firms
A representative firm produces the final good y using a Cobb-Douglas technology
with constant returns at the private level but which is also affected by a public good
externality, y = Akα(LG)1−α, where α ∈ (0, 1) is the share of capital income in
GDP, G is the per capita quantity of government purchases of goods and services
and A is the constant TFP. We assume that population is normalized to one, L = 1,
so that we get a standard Barro-type [3] formulation such that y = AkαG1−α. Profit













We consider a representative household endowed with a fixed amount of labor and
an initial stock of private physical capital which depreciates at rate δ > 0. His




with σ > 0 the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption.
The representative household derives income from wage and capital. Denoting
τ > 0 the tax rate on consumption, his budget constraint is given by:
(1 + τ)c+ k̇ = rk + w − δk (3)
with r and w as given by (1).
The representative household then solves the following problem taking as given







s.t. k̇ = rk + w − δk − (1 + τ)c
k ≥ 0, c ≥ 0
k(0) = k0 > 0 given
where the set of admissible parameters is so defined
Θ ≡ {(α, ρ, δ, σ, A) : α ∈ (0, 1), ρ > 0, δ > 0, σ > 0 and A > 0}.




+ λ[rk + w − δk − (1 + τ)c]
where λ is the utility price of the final good. Considering (1), the first order condi-
tions with respect to the control, c, and the state, k, write respectively








− δ − ρ (5)














Let us then substitute equation (5) into (6). It follows that, given an initial capital
stock k0, the tax and government spending path (τ(t),G(t))t≥0, the representative
household maximizes his/her utility by choosing any path (c(t), k(t))t≥0 which solves
the system of ODEs





















e−ρt = 0 (9)
3 Balanced-budget rule and fiscal policy
This section is organized as it follows. First, we emphasize the deep difference be-
tween exogenous and endogenous growth models. In particular, we show that global
indeterminacy emerges naturally in an endogenous growth model if the government
balances its budget in each period and the tax rate is endogenous and time-varying
as usually assumed in exogenous growth models (e.g. Giannitsarou [13]). This re-
sult does not depend on the type of taxation and, for example, it still holds with an
income tax.
Secondly, we argue that a natural attempt to rule out this global indeterminacy
consists in introducing a fiscal policy rule. Therefore, we design a fiscal policy
rule such that the tax rate is still endogenous, time-varying and also predetermined.
Later, and specifically in Section 7, we prove under which conditions the fiscal policy
rule is indeed effective in ruling out global indeterminacy and therefore aggregate
instability. To do so, we will have to investigate first all the possible equilibria which
may exist.
3.1 Exogenous vs endogenous growth models
In exogenous growth models where labor supply is endogenous and government
spending is unproductive, local indeterminacy may emerge if the government bal-
ances its budget in each period and the tax on labor income is time-varying and
endogenous (e.g. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [28]). Formally, local indeterminacy
may emerge under the following balanced-budget rule G = τwL where G is usually
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exogenously given and possibly time-varying.5 Observe that the tax rate is endoge-
nous and time-varying because it must adjust in each period to balance the budget.
In the same framework, changing the labor income tax with a consumption tax rules
out local indeterminacy when the utility function is CES (see Giannitsarou [13]).
Let us now investigate what happens to the Barro’s model if the tax rate is
allowed to be time-varying and endogenous and the government balances its budget
in each period. Similarly to Giannitsarou [13], the balanced-budget rule is
G = τc. (10)
Then the dynamics of the economy can be described by combining the Euler equa-
tion, the capital accumulation equation and the balanced-budget rule. In particular
the following equation in the variable τ and the new variable z ≡ kG describes the






= (1− α)Azα−1 + ρ− τ̇
τ(1 + τ)





Therefore, the model is globally indeterminate because equation (11) is underdeter-
mined (i.e. there are more variables than equations). Intuitively different house-
holds’ beliefs about the evolution of the tax rate can be self-fulfilled by choosing
opportunely different paths of the capital-government ratio.
A natural attempt to avoid this form of pervasive indeterminacy consists in
specifying a fiscal policy rule. In fact, with a fiscal policy rule we may circumvent the
underdetermined issue previously explained. The next section is aimed at designing
a fiscal policy rule.
3.2 Designing a fiscal policy rule
The objective of this section is to design a fiscal policy rule such that the tax rate
is:
i) endogenous,
ii) time-varying but constant in the long run and
iii) predetermined.
5An exception is considered in the quantitative analysis performed by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
[28] where they assume that G is endogenous and depends on the level of income.
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Features i) and ii) are necessary to be consistent with the existing literature on
aggregate instability. The last feature is also desirable because tax rates are typically
set in advance (see for example Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [28] - page 993).
Consistently with the households problem we need to specify a fiscal policy rule
for the consumption tax. In Section 8 we will also provide an insight on what
happens if there is an income tax instead of a consumption tax. We assume that the
fiscal policy rule requires that the tax rate is a function of detrended consumption,
i.e. τ = τ(c̃), and therefore the government balanced-budget rule becomes:
G = τ(c̃)c (12)
where c̃ ≡ ce−γt indicates de-trended consumption with γ the (endogenous) asymp-
totic and constant growth rate of the economy.6 The fiscal instrument τ is clearly
time-varying and endogenously determined; in fact, it is similar to the fiscal policy
suggested by Nourry et al. [25] among others. In particular, Nourry et al. [25]
study, in an exogenous growth model, the case G(c) = τ(c)c while we need that the
tax rate depends on de-trended consumption to have a constant tax on a balanced
growth path.
In addition, we will also assume, from now on, the following:
Assumption 1. The elasticity of the tax rate with respect to de-trended consump-






It is worth noting that such a restriction is common in the literature. In their
seminal contribution, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [28] consider a tax on labor income
with constant government spending such that τ(wl) = G/wl which has a constant
elasticity with respect to its tax base equal to −1. The same property is assumed
by Giannitsarou [13] with a consumption tax satisfying τ(c) = G/c. In Nourry et al.
[25] however, the government spending is assumed to vary with consumption and
the elasticity of the tax rate τ(c) = G(c)/c is equal to η − 1 with η the constant
elasticity of government spending with respect to consumption.
6More precisely, γ is the (constant) growth rate if the economy is on a BGP or is the asymptotic
(constant) growth rate if the economy is not on a BGP but converges over time to an asymptotic
BGP (see Definition 3). In fact, at this stage of the analysis, we cannot exclude a priori the
existence of a subset of initial conditions such that the economy is not on a BGP at t = 0 but
rather converges to it over time as it happens, for example, in an endogenous growth model with
a Jones and Manuelli [17] production function.
9































with B a generic (and endogenously determined) constant. Therefore, the last ex-
pression (16) is rather a menu of fiscal policies. To select just one of them (and
avoiding in this way to introduce a trivial form of indeterminacy in the model) we
assume that τ(0) = τ0 > 0 is exogenously given. By doing so, we may find the













where B = τ0/cφ0 . Clearly the tax rate, τ , is a predetermined variable, in the sense
that the initial value τ0 is given, which is consistent with the fact that tax rates are
typically set in advance and it seems even more compelling in our model where the
tax base is not predetermined since it depends on consumption. It is also worth to
underline that identities (15) and (17) are a direct consequence of Assumption 1.
Note that this formulation is consistent and indeed includes, under the restriction
φ = 0, the case of a constant and exogenously given tax rate τ = τ0 briefly mentioned
by Barro [3]. Moreover, the fiscal rule (15) is pro(counter)-cyclical if φ > 0 (φ < 0)
since it increases (decreases) when consumption grows faster (slower) than γ.7
It is also worth noting that while our formulation is very similar to the one of
Nourry et al. [25], there is a strong qualitative difference: here we postulate a spe-
cific form of the tax function as given by (17) and government spending adjusts
accordingly along the balanced-budget rule (12), while in Nourry et al. [25] the
government spending rule is postulated as in (10) and the tax rate adjusts accord-
ingly since τ(c(t)) = G/c(t). In this case, the tax rate is not predetermined as
τ(0) = G/c(0).
Before concluding this section, we notice that one could be tempted to assume
an exogenous target value for γ. This would lead to two undesirable consequences:
7The definition of pro(counter)-cyclical is based on a comparison of the growth rates. This is
consistent with the real business cycle literature where an economy is said to be in recession if it
grows more slowly than at its trend.
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first, the model becomes an exogenous growth model since it emerges immediately
from the fiscal rule that the growth rate of consumption (and therefore of capital)
will not be anymore determined, as usual in an endogenous growth model, by a
combination of parameters but rather by the target value itself otherwise the tax
rate will be growing in the long run.8 Secondly it can be easily proved that an
equilibrium path will exist only for a zero-measure set of parameters.
4 Intertemporal equilibrium
Given an initial condition of capital k0 > 0 and of the consumption tax τ0 > 0,
an intertemporal equilibrium is any path (c(t), k(t), τ(t),G(t))t≥0 which satisfies the
system of equations (7), (8), (12) and (15), respects the inequality constraints k ≥
0, c ≥ 0, and the transversality condition (9). Put differently, equations (7)-(9) with
(17) then provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for an intertemporal
equilibrium starting from a given pair (k0, τ0).
Therefore we may define the control-like variable x ≡ c
k
and observe that the
intertemporal equilibrium can be derived studying the following system of nonlinear




[(1 + τ)(1− σ)− φτ ] [αA(xτ)1−α − δ − ρ− σγ]
σ(1 + τ) + φτ





σ(1 + τ) + φτ
[
αA(xτ)1−α − δ − ρ− σγ
]
(19)
The interested reader may find in Appendix A the detailed procedure to obtain this
system starting from equations (7), (8), (12) and (15). It is also worth noting that
x0 is not predetermined since it depends on c0 while τ0 is exogenously given and
therefore predetermined.
5 Balanced growth paths
A balanced growth path (BGP) is an intertemporal equilibrium where consumption,
and capital are purely exponential functions of time t, namely:
k(t) = k0e
γt and c(t) = c0e
γt ∀t ≥ 0. (20)
8To see this point even more explicitly, observe that the fiscal rule could be rewritten as τ(t) =
τ0 (c(t)/z(t))
φ with z(t) = c0eγ̄t. Then all the aggregate variables will grow at the rate of the
variable z(t) whose growth rate γ̄ has been given exogenously.
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From equation (15) it follows immediately that along a BGP the consumption tax
is constant and equal to
τ(t) = τ̂ = τ0 ∀t ≥ 0
with the hat symbol indicating, from now on, the value of a variable on a BGP.
Along the BGP, the tax rate is therefore constant and equal to its initial value.
Also, government spending will be purely exponential with a growth rate equal to γ
consistently with the balanced-budget rule (12). Therefore, equations (18) and (19)
rewrite





αA(xτ̂)1−α − δ − ρ
]
. (22)
Studying the zeros of equation (21) is the necessary step to prove existence and





cσ0 (1 + τ0)
e−[ρ−γ(1−σ)]t = 0 (23)
It follows that along a BGP, condition (23) holds if and only if ρ − γ(1 − σ) > 0.
As we restrict our analysis to endogenous positive long-run growth,9 any value of γ
solution of equation (22) needs to satisfy γ ≥ 0 when σ ≥ 1 and γ ∈ [0, ρ/(1 − σ))
when σ < 1.
Proposition 1 (Existence and Uniqueness of a BGP). Given any initial con-
dition of capital k0 > 0 and the tax rate τ0 > 0, there exist A > 0, τ > 0 and
τ̄(σ) ∈ (0,+∞] with τ̄(σ) > τ such that when A > A and one of the following
conditions holds:
i) σ ≥ 1 and τ0 > τ ,
ii) σ ∈ (0, 1) and τ0 ∈ (τ , τ̄(σ)),
there is a unique balanced growth path where the ratio of consumption over capital is
constant and equal to x̂ – the unique positive root of equation (21) – and the growth





αA(x̂τ̂)1−α − δ − ρ
]
> 0, (24)
with τ̂ = τ0.
9We could indeed also focus on negative growth rates γ < 0 implying to consider a long-run
values for capital and consumption equal to zero. As these solutions are ruled out by the Inada
conditions satisfied by the utility and production functions specifications, we do not consider such
possibility.
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Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Discussion of these conditions is in order. The requirements of a level of tech-
nology greater than A and of a tax rate larger than τ guarantee positive economic
growth. The first one is indeed a condition similar to the one in the AK model
while the second one allows to provide a large enough government spending to sus-
tain growth through the technology y = AkαG1−α. Also the condition of a tax
rate lower than τ̄(σ) when σ < 1 guarantees that the transversality condition is
respected and therefore the utility is bounded. Therefore, Proposition 1 shows that
if A > A and one of the conditions i) − ii) holds, a unique BGP exists. Of course,
uniqueness depends on the existence of a unique value x̂ which implies a unique
specification of initial consumption for any exogenously given initial condition of
the capital stock and consumption tax. For any given k0 and τ0, we have indeed
c0 = k0x̂ and τ(c̃) = τ0 so that the stationary value of de-trended consumption c̃
corresponding to the BGP is derived from (20) and such that c̃ = c0 = k0x̂.
Clearly the value of the positive real zero x̂ and of γ̂ depend on the exogenously
given parameters but also on the initial condition of the consumption tax τ0.10 For
this reason we may explicitly write x̂ and γ̂ as continuous and differentiable functions
of these values, i.e. x̂ = x̂(α, τ0, ρ, δ, σ) and γ̂(α, τ0, ρ, δ, σ). Given a generic capital
stock k0, the balanced growth path is
k̂ = k0e
γ̂(α,τ0,ρ,δ,σ)t and ĉ = x̂(α, τ0, ρ, δ, σ)k0e
γ̂(α,τ0,ρ,δ,σ)t
where the growth rate is positive if and only if the conditions of Proposition 1 hold.
For example, it is easy to check numerically that given τ̂ = τ0 = 0.2, the following
parameter’s values, α = 1/3, ρ = 0.01, δ = 0.025 and A = 2.3, imply τ = 0.139
and (x̂, γ̂) = (0.143, 0.0184) when σ = 2, (x̂, γ̂) = (0.106, 0.0239) when σ = 1, and
(x̂, γ̂) = (0.083, 0.025) with τ̄(σ) = 0.2 when σ = 0.6.
It is also worth noting that at the BGP the consumption tax is constant and
therefore not distorting (i.e. lump-sum). Therefore the BGP analysis just done is
identical to an economy where the consumption tax is set to be constant over time.
We conclude this section with some comparative statics results that provide suf-
ficient conditions for the growth rate γ̂ and welfare to be increasing functions of the
tax rate τ0 = τ̂ . Indeed, we can easily compute welfare along the BGP characterized
by the stationary values of the growth rate γ̂ and the ratio of consumption over
10The fact that the taxation enters in the equation of the consumption-capital ratio and therefore




W (γ̂, x̂) =
(x̂k0)
1−σ
(1− σ)[ρ− γ̂(1− σ)]
(25)
We then get the following result:
Corollary 1. Let the conditions of Proposition 1 hold. There exist Amin > A and










Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Obviously, as shown by expression (25), along the BGP welfare is an increasing
function of both the growth rate γ̂ and the ratio of consumption over capital x̂.
Because of the public good externality in the production function, a large growth
factor allows to generate an increasing amount of public good which improves the
aggregate production level and thus consumption. Corollary 1 then provides condi-
tions for a positive impact of the tax rate τ0 on the growth rate, consumption over
capital and welfare. In particular, such a conclusion requires a low enough elasticity
of intertemporal substitution in consumption 1/σ which prevents a too large con-
sumption smoothing over time in order to ensure a larger consumption in the long
run, i.e. along the BGP.
6 Transitional dynamics
6.1 Local determinacy of the steady state (x̂, τ̂)
In this section we start by investigating the local stability properties of the steady
state (x̂, τ̂) (with τ̂ = τ0) which characterizes the unique BGP of our economy. Let
us recall that in the formulation considered by Barro [3] where the tax rate τ is
constant, there is no transitional dynamics and the economy directly jumps on the
BGP from the initial date t = 0. In our framework we get similar conclusions:
Proposition 2. Consider the steady state (x̂, τ̂) (with τ̂ = τ0) which characterizes
the unique BGP of our economy. For any given initial conditions (k0, τ0), there is
no transitional dynamics, i.e. there exists a unique c0 = k0x̂ such that the economy
directly jumps on the BGP from the initial date t = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
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As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, the steady state (x̂, τ̂) is locally saddle-
path stable if and only if φ ∈ (−σ(1 + τ̂)/τ̂ , 0) and locally unstable otherwise.11
However, in both cases, we find the same conclusion as in Barro [3]: there is no
transitional dynamics with respect to the BGP as any initial choice of c(0) different
from c0 = k0x̂ leads to trajectories diverging from (τ̂ , x̂). This is not really surprising
since the tax rate on the BGP is exactly τ̂ = τ0 which is the initial condition of the
state variable of our problem.
Note however that the reasons for the absence of transitional dynamics in our
framework is different than the ones in Barro [3]. In his model, τ is constant by
definition and so is the consumption growth rate ċ/c. In our case, the tax rate can a
priori exhibit counter or procyclicality and there is no transitional dynamics because
of the local stability properties of the BGP.
To make this argument more explicit, consider Figure 1 which illustrates Propo-
sition 2 and shows the phase diagrams when the parameters are set as in the previous
section. The initial conditions are k0 = 1 and τ0 = 0.2, σ = 1 and φ is equal to 0.5
(left diagram) and −0.01 (right diagram). According to the directions of the arrows
it is clear that in both phase diagrams, any choice of x0 6= x̂0 along the vertical
line τ̂ = τ0 leads to paths which cannot converge to (x̂, τ̂). In this case we have
local determinacy of the steady state (x̂, τ̂) since given any k0 and τ0 satisfying the
conditions of Proposition 1, there exists a unique choice of x0 = x̂0 and therefore of
c0 = k0x̂ which pins down an equilibrium path corresponding to the BGP described


































Figure 1: Phase Diagrams when φ = 0.5 (left) and φ = −0.01 (right) and γ = γ̂0
11Note that the change in stability at φ = −σ(1 + τ̂)/τ̂ occurs through a discontinuity in a
similar way as in the model of Benhabib and Farmer [4] (see for example figure 2, page 34) since
one of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix changes its sign from +∞ to −∞.
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6.2 Existence of other equilibria
As we have shown in the previous subsection, the unique steady state (x̂, τ̂) may
be a saddle-point or totally unstable depending on whether φ ∈ (−σ(1 + τ̂)/τ̂ , 0)
or not. While these two possible configurations do not alter the fact that when
τ0 = τ̂ , the economy directly jumps on the BGP from the initial date t = 0, we can
prove that contrary to Barro [3], some particular transitional dynamics may occur
in our model. Indeed, the BGP as defined by (x̂, τ̂) and γ̂ is not the unique possible
equilibrium of our economy. In this section, depending on the value of φ, we look
for the existence of equilibrium paths (xt, τt)t≥0 which may eventually converge to
an Asymptotic BGP, denoted from now on ABGP, defined as follows:
Definition 1 (ABGP). An ABGP is any path (x(t), τ(t))t≥0 = (x∗, τ ∗) such that:
a) τ ∗ is a positive arbitrary constant sufficiently close to (but different from) τ0;
b) (x∗, τ ∗) is a steady state of (18)-(19) with x∗ > 0 and γ∗ > 0 solution of





αA(x∗τ ∗)1−α − δ − ρ
]
. (27)
c) (x∗, τ ∗) satisfies the transversality condition.
Crucially an ABGP is not an equilibrium since it does not satisfy the initial
condition τ(0) = τ0. An ABGP in terms of the original variables is a path
k∗ = k0e
γ∗(α,τ∗,ρ,δ,σ)t and c∗ = x∗(α, τ ∗, ρ, δ, σ)k0e
γ∗(α,τ∗,ρ,δ,σ)t (28)
which is defined as a steady state (x∗, τ ∗) of the system (18)-(19) but is not an
equilibrium because τ ∗ is generically different from the exogenously given initial
condition of the consumption tax, τ0. If such an ABGP exists, the asymptotic
value (x∗, τ ∗) as well as the asymptotic growth rate of the economy γ∗ will not be
pinned down by τ0 through equations (21) and (22) as before, but rather from the
asymptotic value of the consumption tax τ ∗ and then by equations (26)-(27).
The existence of an equilibrium path converging to an ABGP is associated to the
existence of consumers’ beliefs that are different from those associated to the BGP.
Indeed, they may believe that the consumption tax profile will not remain constant
but rather change over time and eventually converge to a positive value τ ∗ 6= τ0.
Therefore, the consumption over capital ratio and the growth rate will converge to
x∗ and γ∗ respectively. Based on that we will prove in the next Proposition that
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under some conditions on φ the consumers may indeed decide a consumption path
which makes this belief self-fulfilling.
Building on Propositions 1 and 2 we can prove the following result:
Proposition 3. Given any initial condition k0 > 0 and τ0 > 0, consider τ and τ̄(σ)
as defined by Proposition 1. There exist A > 0 such that when A > A, there is a
unique equilibrium path (xt, τt)t≥0 converging over time to the ABGP (x∗, τ ∗) if and
only if φ ∈ (−σ(1 + τ ∗)/τ ∗, 0) and one of the following conditions holds:
i) σ ≥ 1 and τ ∗ > τ ,
ii) σ ∈ (0, 1) and τ ∗ ∈ (τ , τ̄(σ)).
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Discussion of these conditions is again in order. First of all, if the consumers
believe that the asymptotic tax rate will be τ ∗ then a unique ABGP exists if one
of the conditions i)-ii) holds. As already discussed previously, the requirement of
a level of technology greater than A is a standard condition for AK models and
a tax rate larger than τ provides a large enough government spending to sustain
growth through the technology y = AkαG1−α. Also the condition τ < τ̄(σ) when
σ < 1 guarantees that the transversality condition is respected and thus the utility
is bounded.
Furthermore, given (k0, τ0) there exists a unique equilibrium path converging to
the ABGP (x∗, τ ∗) if and only if φ ∈ (−σ(1 + τ ∗)/τ ∗, 0). To provide an intuition
for this result let us assume for simplicity that σ = 1. Considering the expression
of the tax rate as given by (17), let us denote g(c) ≡ (1 + τ(c̃))c with c̃ = ce−γt. It




= 1 + φτ
1+τ
Since φ > −(1 + τ ∗)/τ ∗, we get εgc > 0. Consider then the system of ODEs (7)-(8)
with σ = 1 which can be written as
k̇ = AkαG1−α − δk − g(c) (29)
ċ
c
= r − δ − ρ− τ̇
1 + τ
(30)
If households expect that in the future the consumption tax rate will be above
average, then they expect to consume less in the future and thus, considering that
εgc > 0, we derive from (29) that g(c) is decreasing and thus investment is increasing.
This implies that the rental rate of capital r is decreasing and thus through equation
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(30) that consumption is also decreasing. We conclude from the balanced-budget
rule that the tax rate is decreasing and that the initial expectation is self-fulfilling. Of
course this mechanism requires a low enough elasticity of intertemporal substitution
in consumption, i.e. a large enough value of σ, to avoid intertemporal consumption’s
compensations associated to the initial expected decrease of c.
Figure 2 shows the phase diagrams which implicitly account for the consumers’
beliefs of a steady state where the same parameters’ values as in Figure 1 except
































Figure 2: Phase Diagrams when φ = 0.5 (left) and φ = −0.01 (right) and γ = γ̂1
Observe that both the locus ẋ = 0 and τ̇ = 0 are shifted with respect to the
previous case to reflect the different beliefs.12 According to the directions of the
arrows it is clear that in the case of a pro-cyclical consumption tax (i.e. φ = 0.5),
there does not exist an equilibrium path which makes this belief self-fulfilling. On
the other hand, in the case of a counter-cyclical consumption tax (i.e. φ = −0.01)
an equilibrium path converging to the steady state may exist as shown by the golden
path in the Figure. In this case the consumers’ belief is indeed self-fulfilling.
6.3 Overall (deterministic) dynamics
Proposition 3 actually proves that there exists a continuum of equilibria each of them
converging to a different ABGP. In fact, any value of τ ∗ in a neighborhood of the
given initial value τ0 can be a self-fulfilling belief for the consumers if the conditions
of the Proposition are met. Of course this implies a form of global indeterminacy
since from a given τ0, one can select either the unique BGP by jumping on it from the
12This is indeed obvious from equations (18) and (19) since the growth rate, γ, enters explicitly
in both of them.
18
initial date or select any other equilibrium converging to an ABGP. Again different
choices reveal different consumers’ beliefs of the long run outcome of the economy.
Combining the results found in section 3 and subsections 4.1 and 4.2 allows to
state the following Theorem which fully characterizes the dynamics of the economy.
Theorem 1. Given the initial conditions k0 and τ0, let τinf = τ0 − ε > 0 and
τsup = τ0 + ε with ε, ε > 0 small enough. Consider τ and τ̄(σ) as defined by







one of the following conditions holds:
i) σ ≥ 1 and τinf > τ ,
ii) σ ∈ (0, 1), τinf > τ and τsup < τ̄(σ),
then there is a continuum of equilibrium paths, indexed by the letter j, departing from
(τ0, x
j
0), each of them converging to a different ABGP (τ ∗j, x∗j) with τ ∗j ∈ (τinf , τsup),
i.e. the dynamics of the economy is globally, but not locally, indeterminate.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
To fully understand the dynamic behavior of the economy we can write explicitly







where vi ≡ (vi1, vi2)T is the eigenvector associated to the eigenvalue λi, with i = 1, 2
while bi are arbitrary constants. If φ ∈ (−σ(1 + τ ∗)/τ ∗, 0) and assuming without
loss of generality that λ2 > 0, the saddle-path solution can be easily found imposing





with τ̃0 = τ0− τ ∗ and x̃0 = x0− x∗. Therefore, given any initial condition k0 and τ0
we have the following solution of x converging over time to (x∗, τ ∗):





Of course as t → ∞ we have that τ̃ → τ ∗, meaning that c converges to the corre-
sponding ABGP since x→ x∗ also converges to the corresponding ABGP. Observe
also that the initial level of consumption for this equilibrium path can be obtained





(τ0 − τ ∗)k0 (35)
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Remark 1. Note that we have a constraint on the initial choice of c0 (and therefore
on x0) because initial consumption cannot be higher than the initial wealth, c0 ≤
y0 − δk0 − τ0c0 which at the equilibrium implies that








Figure 3 shows the presence of global indeterminacy in the phase diagram (x(t), τ(t)).








































Figure 3: Converging equilibria for different initial values of c0.
The initial tax rate is assumed to be equal to τ0 = 0.2, and the parameters
are chosen as in the balanced growth path section with φ set to −0.5. Different
initial choices of c0 pins down different equilibrium paths of the tax rate and of the
consumption-capital ratio, each of them converging to a different steady state, char-
acterized by a different growth rate of consumption and capital. Similarly Figure 4
illustrates the emergence of global indeterminacy in the spaces (t, x(t)) and (t, τ(t)).
Global indeterminacy arises when the government uses counter-cyclical consump-
tion tax. Under these circumstances, the long run growth rate as well as the con-
sumption over capital ratio cannot be univocally determined within the model.
Therefore an economy characterized by these features and an initial value of the
tax rate τ(0) can remain on a balanced growth path but can also follows alternative
paths towards different ABGPs each of them characterized by a different (asymp-
totic) growth rate.
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Figure 4: Dynamics of the Tax Rate and of the Consumption-capital Ratio for Fiscal
Policy (15)
7 Aggregate instability and stabilization policy
7.1 Sunspot equilibria
Suppose that the households choose an initial value of consumption such that they
are at t = 0 in (τ0, xj0). From Theorem 1, we know that if some conditions on
parameters are respected then the deterministic dynamical system (18)-(19) has a
unique solution around the steady state (τ ∗j, x∗j) converging to it over time. Let us
call this path (x, τ) = φj(t) ≡ (φj,x(t), φj,τ (t)) as shown on the following Figure 7:
As observed before, this is indeed the unique equilibrium consistent with an
asymptotic growth rate γj. Clearly, aggregate instability cannot emerge unless
a) countercyclical taxation is implemented;











Figure 5: Examples of Saddle-Paths
Condition a) is obtained by setting appropriately the elasticity of the tax rate
with respect to de-trended consumption. This is indeed described in details in
Theorem 1.
On the other hand, extrinsic uncertainty can be introduced in the model through
a sunspot variable. Formally, a sunspot variable can be represented by a continuous-
time homogeneous Markov chain {εt}t≥0 with pij(t − s) indicating the transition
probability to move from state i at time s to state j at time t with s ≤ t while the
initial probability distribution of ε0 is denoted by π = (π1, ..., πN) with πj = P(ε0 =
zj). More precisely, we need to consider a probability space (Ω, BΩ,P) where Ω is
the sample space, BΩ is a σ-field associated to Ω, and P is a probability measure.
We assume also that the state space is a countable subset of R:
Z ≡ {z1, ..., zῑ, ..., zN} ⊂ R
with −ε ≤ z1 < ... < zῑ = 0 < ... < zN ≤ ε̄. Then each random variable εt is a
function from Ω→ Z which we assume to be BΩ-measurable.
As explained in Shigoka [29] and Benhabib and Wen [6], the extrinsic uncertainty
modifies the deterministic dynamics described by system (18)-(19), from now on










where m is a constant measuring the weight of the sunspot variable. Two consid-
erations are appropriate: i) the deterministic dynamics can be obtained by setting
m = 0 ii) the sunspot variable does not affect the fundamental of the economy. In
fact, the sunspot variable is a device to randomize among the deterministic equilib-
ria. See the example in the Supplementary Material.
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Before proving the existence of sunspot equilibria, several intermediary steps
need to be done. In the following we explain carefully these steps and at the end we
provide a Theorem which proves our main result.
Differently from the discrete-time case, the evolution of a continuous-time Markov
chain cannot be described by the initial distribution π and the n − step transition
probability matrix, Pn, since there is no implicit unit length of time. However, it
is possible to define a matrix G (generator of the chain) which takes over the role
of P. This procedure can be found in Grimmett and Stirzaker [14] among others
and, as far as we know, our paper represents the first economic application of this
procedure.
Let Pt be the N × N matrix with entries pij(t). The family {Pt}t≥0 is the
transition stochastic semigroup of the Markov chain (see Supplementary Material)
and the evolution of {εt}t≥0 depends on {Pt}t≥0 and the initial distribution π of ε0.
Let us also assume from now on that the transition stochastic semigroup {Pt}t≥0 is
standard, i.e. limt→0 Pt − I = 0 or
lim
t→0
pii(t) = 1 and lim
t→0
pij(t) = 0 for i 6= j
Under these assumptions on the semigroup the following result can be proved:





(Ph − I) = G
i.e. there exists constants {gij} such that
pii(h) ' 1 + giih and pij(h) ' gijh if i 6= j (37)
with gii ≤ 0 and gij > 0 for i 6= j. The matrix G = (gij) is called the generator of
the Markov chain {εt}t≥0.
Proof. See Grimmett and Stirzaker [14], Chapter VI, page 256-258.
Therefore, the continuous-time Markov chain {εt}t≥0 has a generator G which
can be used together with the initial probability distribution π to describe the evo-
lution of the chain. For this purpose, the following definition will turn out to be
useful:
Definition 2. Let εs = zi, we define the “holding time” as
Ti ≡ inf{t ≥ 0 : εs+t 6= zi}
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Therefore the “holding time” is a random variable describing the further time
until the Markov chain changes its state. The following Proposition is crucial to
understand the evolution of the chain from a generic initial state εs = zi.
Proposition 5. Under the assumptions on the Markov chain introduced so far, the
following results hold:
1) The random variable Ti is exponentially distributed with parameter gii. There-
fore,
pii(t) = P(εs+t = zi|εs = zi) = egiit.
2) If there is a jumps, the probability that the Markov chain jumps from zi to
zj 6= zi is −gijgii .
Proof. See Grimmett and Stirzaker [14], Chapter VI, page 259-260.
Through the last Proposition we can fully describe the evolution of the Markov
chain and therefore we have all the ingredients to build sunspot equilibria. Before
doing that we define a sunspot equilibrium as it follows:
Definition 3 (Sunspot Equilibrium). A sunspot equilibrium is a stochastic pro-
cess {(τt, xt, εt)}t≥0 which solves the system of stochastic differential equations (36),
respect the inequality constraints τt, xt > 0 and the transversality condition.
We are now ready to prove the following theorem on the existence of sunspot
equilibria while Figure 6 provides an example of one of these equilibria.
Theorem 2 (Existence of Sunspot Equilibria). Assume that all the conditions
for indeterminacy in Theorem 1 hold and a sunspot variable is introduced in the
model through the continuous-time Markov chain {εt}t≥0. Then sunspot equilibria
exist.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
Theorem 1 shows how to build sunspot equilibria starting from our deterministic
model characterized by a unique deterministic and locally determinate BGP and a
continuum of other equilibria each of them converging over time to a different ABGP.
Contrary to the standard literature where sunspot equilibria are based on the
existence of local indeterminacy (see Benhabib and Farmer [4]), we find sunspot









Figure 6: Example of a Sunspot Equilibrium
other equilibria converging to the ABGPs. From this point of view, our conclusions
share some similarities with Farmer [12] where expectations-driven fluctuations, in
an economy with a continuum of steady states, are generated from the existence
of a continuum of equilibrium unemployment rates. However the presence of a
continuum of steady states is deeply different in the two frameworks because in our
case it crucially depends on the presence of endogenous growth and of endogenous
countercyclical taxation when the government balances its budget. In Farmer [12],
the existence of a continuum of steady states comes from the fact that there is one
less equation than unknown. This under-determinacy arises from the absence of
markets to allocate search intensity between the time of searching workers and the
recruiting activities of firms. To close the model, Farmer then needs to introduce
beliefs about the future value of asset prices, measured relative to the wage, and
this justifies the existence of sunspots.
The existence of sunspot fluctuations with a unique deterministic equilibrium is
also obtained by Dos Santos Ferreira and Lloyd-Braga [10] but again under a quite
different mechanism. Here, the authors consider free entry oligopolistic equilibria
where firms, producing under increasing returns to scale, compete in prices in con-
testable markets. Multiple free entry equilibria may exist, each one characterized
by a number of producing firms that varies according to the (correct) conjectures
of all the competitors. This multiplicity generates a static indeterminacy on which
sunspot equilibria may be constructed while the intertemporal equilibrium is unique.
A direct consequence of Theorem 1 and of the description of sunspot equilibria
done so far, lead to the following result.
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Corollary 2 (Stabilizing fiscal policy) Assume that the fiscal policy is procycli-
cal, i.e. φ ∈ (0,+∞), then aggregate instability cannot emerge.
Of course the reason behind this result is that the dynamics of the economy
with procyclical taxation is globally and locally determinate and therefore it is not
possible to use a sunspot variable to randomize among the deterministic equilibria
because there is only one of them. In fact, in this case we have two strictly positive
eigenvalues and therefore two explosive paths to be ruled out by setting b1 = b2 = 0
in system (31)-(32). In this case the economy has no transitional dynamics and the
only solution is the balanced growth path solution described in the previous section.
7.2 Policy implications
In order to check the empirical plausibility of our results, we provide now a sim-
ple numerical exercise. On the basis of quarterly data, we consider the benchmark
parameterization (s, δ, ρ) = (1/3, 0.025, 0.01). Concerning the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution in consumption, there is no agreement in the empirical literature
about its precise value. While early studies such that Campbell [8] , Kocherlakota
[27] and Vissing-Jorgensen [30] suggest quite low values, more recent contributions,
e.g. Mulligan [23], Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio [31] and Gruber [15], provide
robust estimates of this elasticity between 1 and 2. In light of all these studies, we
may assume that a plausible range for εcc is (0.5, 2). Consumption tax rates have
been estimated by Mendoza et al. [21, 22],13 and more recently by Volkerink and
De Haan [32]. They provide ranges of tax rates for each OECD countries as given
in Table 1:
τ ∈ (0.05, 0.1) Japan, US, Switzerland
τ ∈ (0.1, 0.15) Australia, Canada, Italy, Spain
τ ∈ (0.15, 0.2) Belgium, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Portugal, UK
τ ∈ (0.2, 0.25) Austria, France, Iceland, Luxembourg, Sweden
τ ∈ (0.25, 0.3) Finland, Ireland
τ ∈ (0.3, 0.35) Denmark, Norway
Table 1: Consumption tax rates of OECD countries
As shown in Section 5, choosing A = 2.3 implies a minimal level of tax rate for
indeterminacy such that τ = 0.139, with γ̂ = 1.84% when σ = 2, γ̂ = 2.39% when
13Updated estimates up to 1996 are available online from the authors.
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σ = 1 and γ̂ = 2.5% with τ̄(σ) = 0.2 when σ = 0.6. Except for Japan, US and
Switzerland, we then conclude that, depending on the value of σ, our conditions on
the tax rate for the existence of aggregate instability are empirically plausible for
most OECD countries.
Let us finally consider empirically plausible values of the elasticity φ of the
consumption tax rate. Up to our knowledge there is no direct estimates of this
parameter available in the literature. However, Lane [18] provides some empirical
estimates of the elasticity of government expenditures with respect to output growth.
Since consumption is almost perfectly correlated with output, we use Lane’s results
as a proxy for the elasticity of government expenditures with respect to consumption,
as given by
η ≡ G ′(c)c/G(c) (38)
In the following we will say that public expenditures are counter(pro)-cyclical when
η < 0 (η > 0). Consider then the balanced-budget rule (12) together with the fiscal








η = 1 + φ or equivalently φ = η − 1
From Lane’s approximation of η we can then evaluate empirically plausible values
of φ. The tax rule (17) is therefore counter-cyclical for η < 1, pro-cyclical for η > 1
and constant for η = 1.
Using annual data over 1960−1998 for 22 OECD countries, Lane [18] shows that
in most OECD countries government spending is counter-cyclical, i.e. η ≤ 0.
η ∈ (−0.1, 0] Australia, Greece, Japan, New Zealand, Spain
η ∈ (−0.2,−0.1) Austria, US
η ∈ (−0.4,−0.2) Belgium, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden
η ∈ (−0.7,−0.4) Canada, France, Italy, UK
Table 2: Elasticity of government expenditure of OECD countries
We conclude that the elasticity of the consumption tax rate φ is negative im-
plying thus counter-cyclicality, for most OECD countries. As a whole we have
shown that the existence of aggregate instability and sunspot fluctuations driven by
consumption tax rates is empirically plausible for a large set of OECD countries.
According to the predictions of our model (see Corollary 2), the output volatility
of these countries would reduce in response of a switch from a countercyclical to a
procyclical taxation.
27
8 Income tax vs consumption tax
One could think that our main results strongly rely on the consideration of a con-
sumption tax. This is actually not the case. If we assume that government expendi-
tures are financed through a tax on income, i.e. G = τ(ỹ)y, with ỹ = yeγt, and that
the elasticity of the tax rate with respect to detrended output is constant and equal
to φ, then we find similar results. Indeed, the model is basically the same except
that the capital accumulation equation becomes now
k̇ = (1− τ)AkαG1−α − δk − c
Moreover, solving G = τy = τAkαG1−α with respect to G gives G = (τA)1/αk. From
the corresponding first order conditions, straightforward computations then lead to




















α − δ − γ − x
]
(40)
with x ≡ c
k
. Along a BGP as defined by (20), we find again that τ is constant
and equal to its initial value τ0. It follows that there exists a unique steady-state
of the dynamical system characterized by stationary values of x and γ, i.e. x̂ and
γ̂, that depend on τ0. But there also exist a continuum of ABGP characterized by
an asymptotic value of τ , namely τ ∗ 6= τ0 with τ ∗ sufficiently close to τ0, and of
equilibrium path each of them converging to a different ABGP provided the saddle-
point property holds.
9 Conclusion
We have considered a Barro-type [3] endogenous growth model in which a govern-
ment provides as an external productive input a constant stream of expenditures
financed through consumption taxes and a balanced-budget rule. In order to have a
constant tax on a balanced growth path, the tax rate needs to depend on de-trended
consumption and thus becomes a state variable with a given initial condition. We
also consider a representative household characterized by a CRRA utility function
and inelastic labor. Such a formulation is known to rule out the existence of en-
dogenous fluctuations in a standard stationary framework (see Giannitsarou [13]).
We have proved that there exists a unique Balanced Growth Path (BGP) along
which the common growth rate of consumption, capital, GDP and government
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spending is constant. Moreover, as in the Barro [3] model, there is no transitional
dynamics with respect to this unique BGP. However, we have shown that the BGP
is not the unique long run solution of our model. Indeed, if the tax rule is counter-
cyclical with respect to consumption, for any arbitrary initial value of the tax rate,
close enough to its initial condition, there exists a corresponding value for the tax
rate, consumption, capital and the constant growth rate that can be an asymptotic
equilibrium of our economy, namely an Asymptotic Balanced Growth Path (ABGP).
An ABGP is not itself an equilibrium as it does not respect the initial conditions.
However, some transitional dynamics exist with a unique equilibrium path converg-
ing toward this ABGP, and we prove that there exist a continuum of such ABGP
and of equilibria each of them converging over time to a different ABGP.
The existence of an equilibrium path converging to an ABGP is associated to
the existence of consumers’ beliefs that are different from those associated to the
BGP. Indeed, they may believe that the consumption tax profile will not remain
constant but rather change over time and eventually converge to a positive value
different from the initial condition. Based on this property, we prove the existence
sunspot equilibria and thus that endogenous sunspot fluctuations may arise under
a balanced-budget rule and consumption taxes although there exists a unique un-
derlying BGP equilibrium. Moreover, a simple numerical exercise shows that our
conclusions are compatible with empirically realistic values of the main structural
parameters and tax rates for many OECD countries.
A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of equations (18) and (19)
Dividing equation (7) by k and using the balanced-budget rule we may rewrite the











































Now let us define the control-like variable x ≡ c
k







Subtracting equation (41) from equation (42) and using the definition of the new




(1 + τ)(1− σ)− φτ
σ(1 + τ) + φτ
[
αA (τx)1−α − δ − ρ− σγ
]





σ(1 + τ) + φτ
[
αA (τx)1−α − δ − ρ− σγ
]
(45)
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is articulated in four steps.
The first step of the proof consists in showing that there exists a positive solution
of the equation g(x) = 0. Note first that that g(0) = −ρ− δ(1− σ) < 0 if and only
if σ < σ0 ≡ (δ+ ρ)/δ, limx→+∞ g(x) = +∞, and g′(x) = (α− σ)(1− α)Aτ̂ 1−αx−α +
σ(1+ τ̂). If α ≥ σ, g′(x) > 0 for any x and the uniqueness of the solution is ensured.
On the contrary, if σ > α we get g′(x) = 0 if and only if
x = xmin =
(





Since g(x) is a continuous function, we conclude that g′(x) < 0 when x ∈ (0, xmin)


















































α − δ (46)









the expression (46) is positive and limσ→+∞ g(xmin) = −∞ so that g(xmin) < 0 for
any σ > α. Therefore, from all these results we conclude the following:
- if σ ∈ (α, σ0) then g(0) < 0 and there also exists a unique x̂ solution of g(x) = 0;
- if σ > σ0, then g(0) > 0, g(xmin) < 0 and there exists two solutions of g(x) = 0,
namely x̃ and x̂ with x̃ < x̂.
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The second step of the proof is to verify that the steady state value of x, in
particular in the case of multiplicity, leads to a constant growth rate γ which is
positive and satisfies the transversality condition (23). We need to check that γ > 0





αA(xτ̂)1−α − δ − ρ
]








A sufficient condition for the existence of a steady state value for x, x̂, such that



































It is worth noting that when g(x) < 0, uniqueness of x̂ is also ensured. Indeed,
in the case where σ > σ0, we have shown previously that a second solution x̃ of
g(x) = 0 occurs with x̃ < x̂. It is obvious to derive that if g(x) < 0 then x > x̃ and
x̃ is characterized by a negative growth rate.
Let us consider finally the restriction to satisfy the transversality condition when





αA(xτ̂)1−α − δ − ρ
]
< ρ/(1− σ)






















The right-hand-side of this inequality is decreasing with respect to σ and negative












which can be positive or negative. When this expression is negative, then (49) holds
for any τ0. When this expression is positive, there exists σ1 ∈ (0, 1) such that if
σ > σ1, (49) again holds for any τ0. On the contrary, when σ ∈ (0, σ1), (49) holds if




1−α ( δ(1−σ)+ρα(1−σ) )
−α
1−α−1
To simplify the formulation, we have then proved that when σ < 1, there exists
τ̄(σ) ∈ (0,+∞] such that x̂ < x̄ and the corresponding growth rate γ̂ satisfies the
transversality condition if and only if τ0 < τ̄(σ). But to complete the proof, we need
to show in this case that τ < τ̄(σ). We know that τ̄(σ) is an increasing function
of σ over (0, σ1) and that τ̄(σ1) = +∞. Moreover straightforward computations
show that τ < τ̄(0). Therefore, τ < τ̄(σ) for any σ ∈ (0, 1). The conclusions of the
Proposition follow denoting A = max{A1, A2}.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 1
Under the conditions of Proposition 1, consider x̂ = x̂(α, τ0, ρ, δ, σ) the solution of
equation (21) and recall that τ̂ = τ0. Let us also denote equation (21) as follows







(α− σ) + σ(1 + τ0)
From equation (18) evaluated along the steady state (x̂, γ̂) we derive








(1− α)A(δ + ρ+ σγ̂) + ασ(1 + τ0)[ρ− γ̂(1− σ)]
αx̂
> 0
as the transversality condition (23) holds.






(α− σ) + σx
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Using again (50) evaluated along the steady state (x̂, γ̂) we get







(1− α)(δ + ρ)− σ{x̂[(1− α)− τ0α] + δ(1− α)}
τ0
(52)
If τ0 < (1− α)/α and σ > σ with
σ ≡ (1−α)(δ+ρ)
x̂[(1−α)−τ0α]+δ(1−α)
then the expression (52) is negative. To be consistent with Proposition 1, we need
now to check that τ < (1−α)/α. Using (48), we conclude that this inequality holds
















The result on the growth rate can be found immediately by differentiating equation



























and the result follows.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Let us consider the system (18)-(19)
ẋ =
{
[(1 + τ)(1− σ)− φτ ] [αA(xτ)1−α − δ − ρ− σγ]
σ(1 + τ) + φτ
+ γ(1− σ) + (1 + τ)x− (1− α)A(xτ)1−α − ρ
}
x ≡ ϕ(τ, x) (53)
τ̇ =
φτ(1 + τ)
σ(1 + τ) + φτ
[
αA(xτ)1−α − δ − ρ− σγ
]
≡ φ(τ, x) (54)
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where τ̃ ≡ τ − τ̂ and x̃ ≡ x− x̂.
The proof consists in studying the determinant and trace of the Jacobian matrix,
J, which is the coefficient’s matrix of the linearized system. After some tedious but
straightforward computations, the trace and determinant of the Jacobian can be








+ (1 + τ̂)x̂
It follows immediately that
det(J) < 0 ⇔ φ
σ(1 + τ̂) + φτ̂











∪ (0,∞) we need to study the sign of the trace of the Jacobian.
Assume first that φ < −σ(1 + τ̂)/τ̂ . We then get
(1 + τ̂)(α− σ)− φτ̂ > α(1 + τ̂)
which implies that tr(J) > 0 and the steady state (x̂, τ̂) is totally unstable. Assume
finally that φ > 0. From equations (53)-(54) evaluated at the steady state (x̂, τ̂) we
get
(1 + τ)x̂ = (1− α)A(x̂τ̂)1−α + ρ− γ(1− σ) = (1−α)(δ+ρ+σγ̂)
α
+ ρ− γ(1− σ)
From this expression we derive that
[(1+τ̂)(α−σ)−φτ̂ ](1−α)(δ+ρ+σγ̂)
α[σ(1+τ̂)+φτ̂ ]
+ (1 + τ̂)x̂ = (1+τ̂)(1−α)(δ+ρ+σγ̂)+[ρ−γ̂(1−σ)][σ(1+τ̂)+φτ̂ ]
σ(1+τ̂)+φτ̂
> 0
since the transversality condition implies ρ − γ̂(1 − σ) > 0. It follows again that
tr(J) > 0 and the steady state (x̂, τ̂) is totally unstable.
We have then proved that for any value of σ, the steady state (x̂, τ̂) is either
a saddle-point or totally unstable. Since the stationary value of the tax rate τ̂ is
given by its initial value τ0, in both of these configurations, the only initial value
of x(t) compatible with the transversality condition is x(0) = x̂ and the economy
immediately jumps on the BGP from the initial date t = 0.
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Given a τ ∗ the proof and existence and uniqueness of an ABGP is basically the same
as the proof of Proposition 1 once we have substituted τ ∗ to τ̂ . In particular the









The critical values τ and τ̄(σ) have the same expressions as in the proof of Propo-
sition 1 while A = max{A∗1, A2}.
Concerning the asymptotic stability of (x∗, τ ∗), the computations given in the
proof of Proposition 2 applies so that (x∗, τ ∗) is saddle-path stable if and only if
φ ∈ (−σ(1 + τ ∗)/τ ∗, 0). In this case, for a given τ0 close enough to τ ∗, there exists
a unique value of x(0) such that the equilibrium path (x(t), τ(t)) converges towards
(x∗, τ ∗). Note that if on the contrary, φ ∈ (−∞,−σ(1 + τ ∗)/τ ∗) ∪ (0,+∞), then
(x∗, τ ∗) is totally unstable and, therefore, an equilibrium (xt, τt)t≥0 converging to the
ABGP does not exist. Indeed, in this case, as τ(0) = τ0 6= τ ∗, the only equilibrium
path is to jump on the unique BGP as given by (x̂, τ̂).
A.6 Proof of Theorem 1
The result follows from Propositions 1, 2 and 3. Note that the value of A1 or A∗1 is
now substituted by















The critical values τ and τ̄(σ) have the same expressions as in the proof of Proposi-
tion 1 while A = max{Amax1 , A2}. Moreover, the condition on φ becomes φ ∈ (−φ, 0)
with





Assuming also τinf > τ and τsup < τ̄(σ), we get that for any τ ∗j ∈ (τinf , τsup), the
conditions for the existence of a solution of system (26)-(27) as given in Propositions







, local determinacy means that for any given τ0 there
is a unique equilibrium path either jumping on the unique BGP (x̂, τ̂) or converging
toward some ABGP (τ ∗j, x∗j) with τ ∗j ∈ (τinf , τsup). Global indeterminacy means
that while the initial tax rate τ0 is given, the economy may converge to different
asymptotic equilibria depending on the beliefs of the agents. Also we have not only
multiple equilibria but a continuum of them. In fact, under the condition on φ we
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have that variations of τ ∗ make x, det(J), tr(J) change continuously. The last two
changes imply a continuous changes of the eigenvalues, λ1, λ2, and of the associated
eigenvectors. Therefore, the solution of x will also change continuously.
Finally, when φ ∈ (0,+∞), the unique equilibrium path consists in jumping on
the unique BGP from the initial date. There is thus local and global determinacy.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 2
Assuming that all the conditions in Theorem 1 are respected, a sunspot equilibrium
starting at t = 0 in state j with probability πj can be summed up as follows:14
(xt, τt) = φj(t), for t ∈ [0, tj) (57)




(xt, τt) = φi(t), for t ∈ [tj, ti) (59)
with tm a value taken by the random variable Tm ∼ egmmt with m = i, j for any
i, j = 1, ..., N and i 6= j. The jump in the control-like variables at date ti have size
s(zi− zj), and the resulting path respects the inequalities constraints as long as ε, ε̄
and s are sufficiently small. An example of a sunspot equilibrium is drawn in Figure
8.
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Before studying the existence of sunspot equilibria in our continuous time environ-
ment, it is useful to provide an example in discrete time assuming a period length
equal to a positive integer, h.1 Due to the presence of extrinsic uncertainty, the




= F (xt, τt)h with (x0, τ0) given
where ∆χt+h ≡ χt+h − χt with χ = x, τ , Et is a conditional expectation operator,
and F (xt, τt) is the left hand side of the continuous time dynamical system, after
(36) has been multiplied by x and (37) by τ . Since there is no intrinsic uncertaity









with (x0, τ0) given (60)
where Et(∆εt+h) = 0 with εt the sunspot variable (see Shigoka [29] or Benhabib and
Wen [6], among others).
Suppose now that the sunspot variable, εt takes the values (0, z1, z2) at dates
(0, t1 +h, t2 +h) respectively.2 Therefore, the dynamics of the system in the interval





= F (xt, τt)h with (x0, τ0) given
1In the following we assume that the dynamics is indeed invariant to the choice of time.
2Two remarks are in order. First, a sunspot is, as usual, an unanticipated random shock from
the household’s perspective. Second, the values taken by the sunspot variable as well as the time












Figure 7: Examples of Saddle-Paths
which we know from Theorem 1 to have a unique solution in a neighbourhood of
the steady state. In fact, such theorem tells us that given an initial condition the
economy is on its BGP or there is a unique equilibrium path converging to an ABGP
(see Figure 7). Let us indicate this equilibrium path with
{xt, τt}t1t=0 = {φ1x(t), φ1τ (t)}t1t=0.
























where the first two terms on the RHS are obtained considering the equilibrium path
found previously. Based on this observation, it follows that the dynamics of the




= F (xt, τt)h with (xt1+h, τt1+h) given by (61). (62)
Again from Theorem 1, we know that there exists a unique solution of this IVP in a
neighborhood of the steady state. In fact, we proved that the dynamical system has a
continuum of solutions, each of them associated with a different inital condition and,
crucially, converging to a different ABGP with a different asymptotic growth rate.
The presence of the sunspot variable has just modified the deterministic framework
by allowing a “jump” at date t1 + h of size sz1 in the no-predetermined variable,
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as it emerges from (61),3 while the dynamics of the economy is still described by
F (.) since the uncertainty is extrinsic and does not affect the fundamentals. The
equilibrium path in the interval t ∈ [t1 + h, t2] will be the solution of (62):




Of course, the realizations of the sunspot variable and of the parameter, s, have to
be choosen, as usual, sufficiently small to guarantee that the resulting equilibrium








Figure 8: Example of a Sunspot Equilibrium
Similarly the equilibrium path in the interval t ∈ [t2 + h,∞], will be derived
as the solution of the same dynamical system F (xt, τt)h, where this time the given















Again, the presence of the sunspot variable and specifically of the change in its
realization at date t2 +h implies a “jump” of size s(z2− z1) in the no-predetermined
variable but no change in the fundamentals and hence no change in F (.). The
equilibrium path in the interval t ∈ [t2 + h,∞] will be:




3In continuous time, the jump of the no-predetermined (control) variable at time t1 can be
easily derived from equation (61) considering the limit h→ 0+.
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Under the conditions in Theorem 1, this equilibrium path will converge over time
to an ABGP with an asymptotic growth rate γ3. An example of the resulting
path is shown in Figure 8. From this example, two considerations: first, a sunspot
equilibrium will be indeed a randomization over the deterministic equilibrium paths
found in the previous sections; secondly, the continuous time case can be naturally
derived by considering the limit h→ 0.
Further details on sunspot equilibria
Definition 4 (Markov property). A family of random variables {εt}t≥0 satisfies
the Markov property if
P(εtn = zj | εt1 = z1, ..., εtn−1 = zn−1) = P(εtn = zj | εtn−1 = zjn−1)
for all z1, ..., zn−1 ∈ Z and any sequence t1 < t2 < ... < tn of times.
Definition 5 (Homogeneity). A Markov chain is homogenous if given the tran-
sition probability
pij(s, t) ≡ P(εt = zj|εs = zi) for s ≤ t
we have that
pij(s, t) = pij(0, t− s) ∀i, j, s, t,
and we write pij(t− s) for pij(s, t).
Definition 6 (Stochastic semigroup). A transition semigroup {Pt}t≥0 is stochas-
tic if it satisfies the following:
i) P0 = I;
ii) Pt is stochastic (i.e. pij(t) ≥ 0 and
∑N
j=1 pij(t) = 1)
iii) Ps+t = PsPt if s, t ≥ 0
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